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should be cleared with the author.EXPORT PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF SINGAPORE
Part I; Background and Government Policies
1. Singapore as an entrepot centre
The growth of Singapore as a city started only in the nineteenth cen-
tury when Sir Stamford Raffles landed there in search of a commercial
centre for the (British) East India Company which acquired the whole
island in 1824. The island had then only a few traders and fishermen.
Shortly, however, it became an important trading and also an admini-
strative centre first for the Straits Settlement, and later also for
the Malay States. For its rapid subsequent growth Singapore had
literally nothing but:
(a) a good port in a good location, on the crossroads of the seas;
(b) "free port" status;
(c) a higher degree of security than prevailed in the region (pro-
vided by the British power).
Remark: This Working Paper is a short version of a report submitted
to the Kiel Institute of World Economics in November 1972. It forms
part of a research project on "Import Substitution and Export Diversi-
fication in Selected Developing Countries" which is being undertaken
at the Kiel Institute with financial support of the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft. The report has been written when I was on sabbatical
leave from the University of Queensland, Australia. I wish to acknow-
ledge gratefully the advice and cooperation of the Government of
Singapore, in particular, ?lr. Ling Ten Ing, and Mr. J. Tan of the
Trade Division, and the cooperation of the interviewed members of the
Singapore business commotity.
All values in this paper, unless otherwise stated, are in Singapore
dollars.- 2 -
These meagre assets proved quite adequate to produce an important com-
mercial centre. Until a few years ago Singapore was nothing but an
entrepot trade base. Traders of many nations have found it convenient
to use Singapore for receiving and handling goods in transit from,
and tos all parts of the world, but especially goods moving in the
region. This entrepot trade involves buying, e.g., various grades of
rubber in small lots from various small producers or traders in the
area, putting the lots together, grading them, packing them, and then
re-exporting them to any part of the world. For many years, and even
now, the local handling of those materials was slight so that the
value added per dollar of sales was also slight. The volume of such
trade was very high, however, and this gave the island its economic
viability. The other element of this entrepot trade consisted in the
practice of Singapore merchants buying manufactured goods in large
lots in the advanced countries and then breaking-down these lots into
small ones convenient for the small business firms in the whole of
Southeast Asia, but especially the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia.
The stability of the currency (to this day the currency has solid
international reserves much in excess of 100 per cent of banknotes
issued), law and order, "free port" status, the skills and the ser-
vices of the merchants (e.g., they give credit to Indonesian buyers
and sellers) have given Singapore an almost irresistible appeal as a
place to buy in or to sell in, in the eyes of the traders of the
region, in spite of strong attempts of the governments of the indepen-
dent Malaysia and Indonesia to compel their traders to by-pass
Singapore. The governments of these two countries havfe become jealous
of Singapore's prosperity and growth (Singapore, next to Japan 'and'
Hong^Kong^is! teiie.fehrrd ri cites €\country in Asia)" O- and regarding the
entrepot trade as unnecessary and even harmful to them they have been
using a great variety of official means to choke that trade off. In
these attempts the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments have so far
been only partly successful but Singapore Government has read the
long-run warning on the wall.- 3 -
2. Inadequacy of Entrepot Trade for Singapore
In any case with the advent of its partial independence in 1959 and
complete one in 1965 Singapore Government came to the view that while
entrepot trade was still nice to have it was inadequate for the coun-
try. Shortly, the government decided on full-scale industrialisation.
Its reasons were that the very high population growth would, with the
old economic policies, result in much unemployment, and in addition
could not bring a high income per gainfully occupied worker. And
indeed population growth was extraordinarily high. Between 1947 -57
the average annual rate was 4.3 per cent (probably close to the world
recQrd) and between 1957-62 it was a still very high 3.6 per cent.
Although subsequently the population growth slackened (due to growth
of education, urbanisation, government educational campaign in favour
of a two-children family, changes in immigration policy, as well as
changes in the age structure of population) to a rate of 2.5 per cent
between 1962-66, and to 1.7 per cent in 1970, the government had good
reason to continue to be concerned about the employment opportunities,
because population growth bulge was (and is) still to hit the labour
market. In that context the British government-Snaounced that it would
close down: her military;bases in Singapore (large naval dockyards -, "airrfiorce
and army bases). These bases were giving directly large primary employ-
ment to Singapore citizens, as well as indirect, or secondary employ-
ment through the multiplier effect of expenditures of the people (local
or British) on the military payroll. That announcement appeared as a
disaster at the time and galvanised the government, and a responsive
public, into action.
3. The Response of Singapore Government to the Situation
Looking back, it is possible now to argue that from an economic point
of view the British withdrawal was a blessing in disguise. Coming in
the context of full independence^and full realization that Singapore- 4 -
was all on its own it produced a marvellous economic response in
Singapore's public and government. The matter of the closing down of
the British naval base was quickly (and looking back, also easily)
dealt with. Singapore's government took over the naval dockyards,
which were run fully on commercial lines, and grew in a few years to
have large commercial output. In addition, the government converted
into a commercial enterprise Keppel Shipyards, formerly run as a
division of the Port of Singapore Authority, which stimulated Keppel
Shipyards (Pte) Ltd. (fully owned by government) into higher invest-
ment and output. The government also went into a joint venture with
the Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (of Japan) to establish
Jurong Shipyards on virgin soil, the newly government-established
Jurong industrial estate. In a few years these created more employ-
ment and income than the British naval base ever did .
But Singapore Government could not be sure of that progress in advance,
and the population bulge was still to hit the labour market. The
government therefore decided to take a large number of steps. They
were intended to: increase productivity and exports directly, and to
increase investment by creating a favourable investment climate for
both the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, which in turn would
Singapore government-owned enterprises include also other firms, e.g.,
INTRACO and Singapore Development Bank; they are all successful.
This in the context of experience of other countries seems almost
unique, and prima facie surprising. But in fact there is nothing
unique, or nothing surprising about it. There is nothing intrin-
sically wrong in a commercial enterprise owned by government. It
does not in its structure or processes differ from a privately-owned
company. Both have "red tape", both have similar problems and means.
What however, often distinguished a publicly-owned enterprise (of
the British model) is that it is often told not to make profits, but
to pursue some other objectives. Once an enterprise is told not to
make profits, all sorts of slackness and abuse are easy and natural.- 5 -
increase employment, exports and economic growth rate. At first the
steps were concerned mainly with employment. Later the steps have
aimed at export capacity and economic growth. These steps were:
- Improvement of the infra-structure,
- Establishment in 1961 of the Economic Development Board.(EDB),
- Imposition in the early 1960's of tariffs on a number of products
(in a hitherto "free port"),
- Income tax exemptions as an incentive to economic development (began
in 1960),
- "Industrial Estates",
- Establishment of the Development Bank of Singapore Ltd., with 49
per cent government ownership (1968),
- Direct entry of the Singapore Government into many business firms,
- Establishment of the International Trading Company (INTRACO) with 30 par
cent government ownership (1969),
- Establishment of the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial
Research (SISIR)
- Improvement of industrial relations by legislation "with teeth
;i,
- Drawing up national economic plans.
4. The Improvement of the Country's Infra-structure
The government has spent large sums of money on the provision of more
education, especially technical education. Under the British rule,
in 1951, the number of pupils was 156,000, but in 1971 it was more
than three times larger (516,513) and public expenditure on education
grew almost ten times, from S$22 million in 1951 to S$218 million in
1971.
1
The government has also been expanding public utilities, expanding
the existing port, building a new port in Jurong, building a new con-
tainer port, electric power plant, gas and water supply, and has pro-
vided developed industrial land. As a result new industries have a
plentiful supply of all public services, and a well-educated labour
force.
Ministry of Culture, Singapore Facts and Pictures, 1972, p. 93.- 6 -
5. Economic Development Board (EDB)
The EDB was established in 1961. It is a government department whose
functions are to provide direct assistance to industry and would be
entrepreneurs. For this purpose it was allocated initially a sun of S$ 100
million. It provided then industrial sites and even factory buildings,
or gave loans to starting firms. By now it has passed over some of
these specialised functions to the subsequently established Develop-
ment Bank of Singapore and the Jurong town Corporation, and it is
limited to giving advice on such matters as, e.g., choice of site,
legal formalities, financing etc. In addition, it also gives business
introductions, helps to train labour and will generally give a domes-
tic or foreign entrepreneur any assistance.
Protective Tariffs
Singapore arose and grew in the last 150 years chiefly thanks to its
being a "free port". In the 1960's this policy was partly reversed
and tariffs were imposed on a limited number of consumer goods, (e.g.,
shoes) but also on some producer goods. The government had great
fears about job opportunities, was unsure of the effectiveness of the
other policies of industrialisation, and decided to use this tradi-
tional method too. But the government was half-hearted about it even
initially and decided later not to grant any new protection. In the.
first instance in view of the small domestic market Singapore's
economic development has to be export-oriented. For the rest, the
case for tariffs might be argued either as offsetting a general cost
disability, or as offsetting a specific cost disability in some "desir-
able" industries. If a country does have a general cost disability
this must reflect itself in an unfavourable balance of payments.
Tariff could partially offset such a general cost disability, but
devaluation would offset it more completely and more evenly, because
devaluation of, say 10 per cent equals a tariff of 10 per cent on all- 7 -
imports plus a subsidy of 10 per cent on all exports. Thus devalua-
tion would be better for that case, removing "the general cost disabi-
lity" in both the import-competing and the export industries.
As for any specific cost disability, in any specific "desirable" indus-
try, the Singapore Government did not then have any preferences
between industries. It was solely concerned with the creation of jobs.
Although lately it has developed a preference for some industries,
i.e., the modern ones with high incomes and good growth potential,
the government realises that the market for such goods is abroad and
therefore tariff encouragement for them is irrelevant!
7. Income Tax Incentive System
Already in 1959 the government introduced temporary income tax exemp-
tions for "pioneer firms". Subsequent acts were consolidated in the
Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act of 1970.
The Act gives the Minister of Finance the power to give partial or
complete exemption from income tax to the firms that in his opinion
fall into the following categories:
(a) "pioneer firms" or "pioneer products";
(b) "expanding firms";
(c) firms "increasing exports";
(d) approved firms borrowing abroad for productive equipment;
(e) approved firms paying royalties or fees for foreign technology.
(a) "Pioneer Status"
This is the only category of firms that qualified in fact in a
significant number of cases for the income tax concession. At
the end of 1971 there were 322 firms that received "pioneer
status" for some of their products. Out of this total 256 firms- 8 -
had some foreign equity (shareholdings and 66 had none.
The criteria for award of the status have changed. During the
1960's the government being extremely anxious to encourage in-
vefftnsenfcs••:. for employment's sake was prepared to grant "pibneer
status" if:
(1) the industry did not operate on an adequate scale in
Singapore, and
(2) it had a favourable prospect.
By 1970 the government saw that investment, local and especially
foreign,had come to be high and the employment problem had been
solved: therefore,it decided to apply the following, additional,
stricter criteria:
(3) the company has incurred or is intending to incur a fixed
capital expenditure of riot less than S$l million (stipulated
by the 1970 Act),
(4) the company must bring and develop technological skills (this
is the operative criterion of the Minister of Finance),
(5) local value added must be high in the Minister's judgement,
(6) the company must already have developed export markets.
This stiffening of'conditions was logical under the new circum-
stances, however, the condition that the value added by the firm
must be high was a mistaken one. Of course, the term "high local
value added" has a nice sound, but in fact per se it denotes
nothing desirable (unless one is a mercantilist) nor is it a good
proxy for such good things as high wages or technology, or
2
profits. It merely means that a great deal of local resources
Calculated on the basis of information provided by the Government of
Singapore.
2
This reasoning is confirmed by an analysis of Table 7 in the Budget
Speech of the Minister of Finance, March 1972, where it can be seen
that a high ratio of value added in an industry does not necessarily
go together with high wages or high technology.- 9 -
is used, which in Singapore conditions must mean that a lot of
labour is used - and the inadequacy of this criterion has been
the very reason for adding the new conditions!
The "pioneer status" has received much attention and comment in
the world. Its importance and its benefits have been grossly
overrated. In the first instance, this privilege is nowadays
given for five years (and the earlier Acts gave even shorter
period of tax concessions). It should be obvious that few firms
would expect their "pioneer" product to be profitable in the
first five years. Thus if the product sells in the first few
years at a loss and then brings slight profits in the fourth and
fifth year the value of the income tax concession must be negli-
gible. This reasoning is fully confirmed by the firms' responses
to this writer's questionnaire survey (analysed later ): an
overwhelming majority of interviewed firms found the status of
negligible financial significance and some companies surrendered
the privilege as not worth the trouble. However, the psycholo-
gical significance of the Economic Expansion Incentives Act may
have been considerable, especially for the foreign companies who
being under nationalistic attacks in many countries found in
Singapore a welcome not only in words, but in what appeared real
terms.
(b) "Expanding Firm"
The Economic Expansion Act provides that where a firm's capital
expansion expenditure exceeds S$10 million the Minister of Finance
may give it the status of an "expanding enterprise", if he thinks
it "in the public interest". The first condition above would
make this incentive rarely applicable. In fact, only one firm,
of national character, with government equity participation, has
ever been given this status. The tax privilege for the "expand-
ing firm" is exemption from income tax for a period up to five
years for the excess of the post-expansion income over the pre-
expansion income.- 10 -
(c) "Export Enterprise"
The Minister of Finance may, in his discretion, grant the
"export status" to a firm whose export sales "in the first export
expansion" year are at least 20 per cent of its total sales and
not less than S$100,000, while in the subsequent years the first
condition may be waived by the Minister. The tax exemption then
applies only to the excess of export profits over a fixed sum
(average annual export profits over preceding three years for old
exporters; discretionary figure fixed by the Minister for new
exporters). Basically the period of tax concession is fixed at
five years, but for a company that also has "pioneer status" at
eight years in the aggregate, and it may be extended to 15 years
if the firm:
(1) has incurred or intends to incur a fixed capital expenditure
(excluding land) of S$l,000,000,000, or
(2) having incurred a lesser capital expenditure but not less
than S$150,000,000, if the firm is more than 50 per cent
Singapore-owned.
In addition, the Minister of Finance may in his sole discretion
extend the tax relief period "... for such further period as he
thinks fit". By the end of 1972 the number of firms which were
given "export status" was 30 (out of a total of almost 800 manu-
facturer-exporters). But it is unlikely that this incentive has
had any influence in producing the very fast expansion of exports
of Singapore. For a logical business manager an income tax
relief given in respect of (increased) export income cannot be an
inducement to export more. If exporting is profitable (gives
income on which income tax would fall) the manager will export
anyway, irrespective of whether the government does or does not
give an income tax relief. If, on the other hand, the manager
thinks that exporting would give no profit then the income tax
exemption is irrelevant to him and therefore could not motivate
him.- 11 -
Theoretically speaking, there could still be the case where
the manager sees fairly low profitability in exporting and a high
profitability in the domestic market, then assuming the existence
of a few other conditions he might give preference to the domes-
tic market at the expense of the export market and reverse the
policy with the "export status" concession. Even if this did
happen it is doubtful whether that incentive would be good for
the home country: the unsatisfied domestic demand would increase
demand.for imports! Above all, for the vast majority of
Singapore manufacturers the domestic market hardly exists partly
because of small population, still fairly low income, and partly
because Singapore is still almost a "free port" so that the access to tha
domestic market is no easier than the world markets. In any
case, if there were cases where the domestic market is more
profitable (but our interview survey proves the opposite) a logi-
cal manager would expand his output so as to draw both the high
domestic profits and the lower profits in exporting. He would
do this irrespective of the income tax concession.
Briefly, the particular Singapore export incentive was a mistake.
To be effective an export incentive may be linked to anything
(e.g., cost of transport, or production, or advertising) but not
to income. The most that the Singapore "export status" could
have done was publicity that exporting is important for the
country. As such it was unnecessarily expensive for the govern-
ment.
(d) Tax Concessions on Interest, Royalties, Fees and Contributions to
Research and Development Payable to Foreigners
Interest on loans taken abroad are, of course, subject to Singapore
tax. However, if the Minister of Finance rdves the loan
" for ; the purchase of productive equipment " the status of
an " £>T»proved foreign loan " then the interest payable to
the foreign lender is exempted from tax. The effect of this- 12 -
concession is that the foreign lender who is, of course,
interested only in net payment will then accept a lower gross
interest rate, which benefits the Singapore borrowing firm. The
condition for this concession is that the foreign government
does not increase the foreign tax imposed upon the lender
because of the exemption. This provision of the Economic Expan-
sion Incentives Act has again been little used, partly because
in many cases the foreign government would offset the Singapore
tax reduction by its own tax increase, and partly because some-
times such payments can be made in such a way that they do not
attract any tax anyway. The Singapore tax involved here used to
be 40 per cent, but in October 1972 the Singapore Government
announced that the rate would be reduced to 10%. This change
further reduced the significance of the concession.
A comparable tax relief can be given on payments to non-residents
in respect of royalties, technical assistance fees, and contri-
butions to the costs of research and development. For similar
reasons as above these provisions have been little uaed.
8. Industrial Estates
Singapore, like many underdeveloped countries, used to be short of
industrial (serviced with utilities) land and of industrial buildings.
Such condition grossly inhibits the anyway weak entrepreneurial spirit
in an underdeveloped society. To deal with this problem the Singapore
Government decided already in the 1950's to develop (outside the city)
large areas of virgin land (in the case of Jurong involving reclama-
tion of swampy land) as "industrial estates" to be offered for pur-
chase or leasing, fully developed, serviced, and often with buildings,
to the would-be private entrepreneurs. This development has been
pushed vigorously in the last ten years and as a result industrial
sites and premises can be easily had and at a reasonable price.Singapore has now twelve "industrial estates": Jurong Town (the
largest and the most developed), Kampong Ampat, Tanglin Halt, Kallang
Basin, Kallang Park, Tiong Bahru, Redhill, Kranji, Senoko, St.
Michael's Estate, Ayer Rajah, and Toah Payoh. Present planning
includes the development of additional estates in Sembawang and Telok
Blangah areas. These "industrial estates" were developed mainly on
land that had no economic value before. Apart from assisting indus-
trialisation they assist decentralisation of economic activities and
of population out of the city of Singapore where the private and
social costs of further growth have become very high.
9. The Development Bank of Singapore
Although commercial banking is plentiful in Singapore its busines
criteria inherited from the British banking tradition are somewhat
conventional and restricted, especially in the field of long-term
lending, lending to newly-established firms and lending on the secur-
ity of real estate. In addition, commercial banks tend to be exces-
sively cautious about risky new enterprises. To supplement the ordi-
nary banking services in those areas the Singapore Government set up
in 1968 the Development Bank of Singapore Ltd. jointly owned by
private shareholders (51 per cent) and the Government (49 per cent)
with, an authorised share capital of S$200 million half paid up. Its
functions are to provide:
(a) long-term capital to industries on loan basis;
(b) equity capital;
(c) guarantees for developing firms;
(d) technical and managerial assistance to firms (on a consultancy
basis);
(e) management of the Singapore Government's equity portfolio in over
59 companies (since 1971);
(f) real estate development, in particular the Singapore Urban
Renewal Programme.The Development Bank normally provides loans up to 50 per cent of
equipment costs, and up to 60 per cent of costs of land and buildings.
It itself has several lines of credit (but almost all of them at the
market rate of interest) from the Government, but against this it is
supposed to take somewhat greater risks in respect to the size of the
loans it gives, the nature of the enterprise, and the duration of the
loan, and it charges fractionally lower rates of interest than the com-
mercial banks do.
In 1972 the Development Bank entered the Asian Dollar Market which the
Singapore Government is trying to develop. The Singapore Asian Dollar
Market until then dealt only in short-term and medium-term loans.
Then the Development Bank floated long-term (1972-1982) bonds denomin-
ated in U.S. dollars.
Although the Bank has been conceived as an instrument of assisting
economic development it is expected to pay its own way and to make
profits. The Bank is in fact making profits, but the return on
capital so far has not been very high. This has been partly due to a
case of bad failure of one assisted company, and partly due to the
short period of the Bank's operation.
10. Government's Direct Entry into Commercial and Industrial Activities
By 1971 the Singapore Government had equity shareholding in 52 com-
catuas f:rom a very Hide spectrum ©f csc-onomic activities . In five a
those companies; Semba^ang Shipyards, Kennel Shiwyeriis, Chartered
Sec next page.- 15 -
Industries (minting coins, production of small arms), Singapore Elec-
tronic Engineering, and Neptune Orient Lines the Government has 100
per cent ownership. In the remaining 47 companies the Government has
a portion of shares. Irrespective of whether the government holds all
the shares or has only a minority holding, it does not interfere with
the running of the companies and expects them to be run on normal
commercial lines and to make profit. In fact, as a rule the Singapore
Government-owned enterprises make profits and some very good profits
(e.g., Intraco). This in the context of the experience of other
countries seems almost unique, and prima facie surprising. However,
there is in principle nothing wrong with government-owned enterprises.
Further, in their organizational structure and management processes
The names of these companies give an idea of industries involved:
Asian Appraisal Pty. Ltd., Bethlehem (Singapore) Pty. Ltd., Blue
Bells Fashions Pty. Ltd., Cedar Garment Factory (S) Ltd., Ceramics
(M.)Ety.Ltd. , Chenta Rayon Co. (Singapore) Ltd., Colex (S) Pty. Ltd.,
Container Warehousing and Transportation(Pty.)Ltd., Copper Indus-
tries, Development Bank of Singapore Ltd., Development Bank of
Singapore Finance Ltd., Development Bank of Singapore Nominees (Pty.)
Ltd., Development Bank of Singapore Realty (Pty.) Ltd., Development
Resources (Pty.) Ltd., Dyno Industries Singapore Pty. Ltd., Eupoc
Pulp and Paper Industries, Fair Lady Fashions, Ltd., Far East
Levingston Shipbuilding Ltd., Hotel Marlin Singapore Ltd., Intema-
national Wood Products Ltd., Intraco Ltd., Jurong Plywood Ltd.,
Jurong Shipbuilders (Pty.) Ltd., Malaysian Feedmills Ltd., Marine
and Contracting Services (Pty.) Ltd., National Iron and Steel Ltd.,
Nagai (S) Pty. Ltd., National Grain Elevator Ltd., Offshore Supply
Association (SEA) Pty. Ltd., Overseas Union Enterprise Ltd., Raffles
Centre (Pty.) Ltd., Shangri-La Hotel Ltd., Sigma Metal Co. (Pty.)
Ltd., Singapore Factory Development Ltd., Singapore Nylon Corpora-
tion (Pty.) Ltd., Singapore Offshore Petroleum Services (Pty.) Ltd.,
Singapore Polymer Corporation Pty. Ltd., Singapore Takada Indus-
tries Pty. Ltd., Slag Industries (Pty.) Ltd., Starlight Timber
Products Co. (Pty.)Ltd., Straits Fisheries (Pty.) Ltd., Tata Preci-
sion Industries (Pty.) Ltd., The Insurance Corporation of Singapore
Ltd., Toppan Printing Co. (S) (Pty.) Ltd., Trans-Aire Electronics
(S) Pty. Ltd., and Veneer Products Ltd.- 16 -
independent "public corporations" do not differ from privately owned
companies. Both have "red tape" and both have unavoidable bureau-
cratic problems. There is only one difference, that of objectives.
Publicly-owned enterprises (e.g., British "public corporations") are
often told not to rank profit-making high, but to pursue some other
"social" objectives. Once an enterprise is told not to bother making
profits all sorts of abuses and slackness are natural. The Singapore
Government has had the independence of mind to drop that sacred cox\r
and to tell the managements the equivalent of: Do what you like but
make profits. You are on your own! This is the secret of the
Singapore Government's success in the field of commercial enterprises.
It has not entered business world because of any doctrinaire beliefs
of its superiority in running business. Quite the contrary! Even in
the fully-owned companies the Government has passed the management
completely to commercial people. It has set up some enterprises, or
in other cases just provided a nucleus of initiative, because it felt
that in some cases private enterprise could not provide so much capi-
tal for a single project, or because private enterprise was too shy
or cautious because of lack of experience. Examples in this category
are the conversion of the vast British naval base into a most success-
ful commercial shipyard (after the British decided to withdraw) and
the equally successful conversion of Port of Singapore Authority's
Shipyards into a vigorous (government-owned) commercial enterprise,
Keppel Shipyards. The Government immediately on acquisition contracted
out the management of these companies to a private firm. The firm,
foreign one at that (Swan Hunter), had two contractual duties; to
run the jGoifipanies at a profit and to train.local managementcwhich
was to;take over after a few years. *
In other cases the Government seeing a worthy private enterprise try-
ing to do something slightly above its financial means, offered to
take up some shares as a means of encouraging the management in their
attempt, and as a means of encouraging the market to provide finance.
In these policies the Government was singularly successful. Not only
did it give a powerful fillip to economic development but also it
acquired a source of income for the Treasury.- 17 -
11. INTRACO
This company was established at the end of 1968 on the Government's
initiative, with 30 per cent Government capital as a "private company",
The company is an exact imitation of the unique Japanese "general
trading companies", like the Mitsui Bussan, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha,
etc. In October 1972 the company went "public" in order to obtain
access to the Stock Exchange finance.
Intraco's main functions are:
(a) assisting exports of Singapore products by direct sale, market
research, promotion etc.;
(b) general trading of any kind, including "triangular trading",
that is, sale of non-Singapore products to non-Singapore buyers;
(c) equity participation in manufacturing companies with export
potential;
(d) bulk buying and selling of raw materials;
(e) financing of exports and imports;
(f) warehousing, providing transport, marine insurance, advertising,
participation in international fairs;
(g) participation in development, ownership and management, of
natural resources including minerals, fishery, forestry, estates
and plantations.
The company has offices in Moscow, Sydney, Djakarta, Saigon and
Duesseldorf. It plans to open offices in U.S.A., U.K., East and West
Africa. It has representative offices in Amsterdam and Phnom Penh.
It has traded with 40 countries. The company at first traded on the
basis of a fixed commission, 10 percent on a sale. This produced
some ill-will among the export producers who felt that a government-
owned company ought not to make profits and therefore ought not to
charge so high a commission. In fact, the company is only partly
For details of the structure and functions of the Japanese "general
trading companies" see: K. Bieda, The Structure and Operation of
the Japanese Economy, John Wiley, Sydney, 1970, Chapter 7.- 18 -
government-owned and in any case the Government quite rightly expects
all its companies to make profits. After this initial experience
Intraco has changed its policy. It finds out what are the prices and
quality of the goods available for export, finds the market for them,
and then if a profitable deal is possible it buys the product from
the manufacturer. This has removed the discontent and has become a
resounding success. In the first full year of its operation its
profits provided a return on capital of 4.3 per cent, in the second
14.3 per cent, and in the third year 26.9 per cent. The company's
turnover reached S$72 million in the third year (1971) of which
exports were about two-thirds. Thus apart from making profits the
company has made possible a substantial (for a company) increase in
exports. Of course, from a national point of view its export figures
are not large, but its record vindicates the Government's judgement
and is a promise of things to come. Like its Japanese models the com-
pany has branched out into manufacturing, and transport facilities.
Like in Japan in the earlier age the "general trading company" has
met a strong need in the situation where a large number of small manu-
facturers arose, unfamiliar with conditions abroad, and unable to
mount their own export effort.
12. Establishment of the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial
Research (SISIR)
The origin of the SISIR was in the Industrial Research Unit estab-
lished in 1963. In its present form the SISIR was established in
1969. It is an agency of the EDB. Its function is to give technical
assistance to producers and a degree of guidance to consumers. It has
two divisions:
(a) Technical Services Division (testing laboratories)
(b) Projects Division: Projects Unit
Standards Section.- 19 -
The Projects Unit advises industrialists, on a consultancy basis,
subject to a fee, about: control of pollution, product development,
and/or process improvement. Annually about 40 firms use the Unit on
control of pollution, and more than 200 firms on product and process
development.
The Standards Section has two main functions:
(a) drawing up specifications for industrial plants;
(b) quality certification of products.
Quality certification of products takes two forms. Where the SIS1R
has already worked out a Singapore Standard it gives the products that
meet its quality criteria the "Singapore Mark" which can be displayed
by the manufacturer on the product for consumers' guidance. Where
the SISIR has not yet worked out its own standard, it can award a
product a "Quality Certificate" which means that the product complies
with some international standard which is stated. The Government is
considering the introduction of compulsory quality inspection of
export products. Some writers consider quality control of exports to
be very important in Japan's post-war growth of exports. This writer's
interviews of a sample of manufacturer-exporters (discussed farther)
showed that in the opinion of overwhelming majority of them quality
control and improvement is by far the most important single factor in
increasing their export sales.
Although the Government took a right step in establishing the SISIR
it cannot be claimed that the Institute has had a marked effect in
increasing exports of Singapore. The effects of the SISIR will show
in the next decade.
13. Improvement of Industrial Relations
Almost all economic measures of the Government aimed basically, even
if indirectly, at improvement of the general industrial investment- 20 -
climate. Restoration of industrial peace was one of the measures.
At the time of acquiring self-government there was a good deal of
industrial unrest, some deliberately stimulated by the x<rarring politi-
cal parties. Once the People's Action Party (originally a leftist
group, now to the right of centre) took over the government, it took
strong steps, especially since full independence (1965), to restore
industrial peace. The Parliament passed the Employment Act and the
Industrial Relations Act. Since then strikes have become rare and
short-lived. The Government has the power to order employers and
employees to go to compulsory arbitration. Further, workers tended
to refuse overtime work precisely when the firm had an urgent contract.
This was the most effective pressure by unions on the management.
But the firm was then liable to lose a contract, actual or potential,
to a competitor abroad. The delays are particularly costly in ship-
repair business both to the customer and to the shipyard. Even
merely high strike-proneness discourages business being brought to a
strike-prone country, and therefore indirectly discourages investment
there.
High incidence of absenteeism also produces similar effects. The
legislation prohibits avoidable absenteeism, and such absenteeism is
probably non-existent in Singapore. The worker is not allowed to be
absent even for one day, even on a Sunday without a good excuse, such
as e.g., illness. If he is absent without excuse he is penalised in
bonus payments and otherwise, and in bad cases may be dismissed.
Industrial relations then in Singapore are now quite different from
the British pattern originally imitated.
' See Table 1.- 21 -
TABLE 1
INDUSTRIAL STOPPAGES






















































































1. Refers to man-days lost on account of a work-stoppage which began
in 1968.
Source: Ministry of Labour
Industrial relations of the British, American or Australian pattern
are now called in Singapore "the British industrial disease". The
Secretary General of the Singapore National Trade Union Congress, Mr.
C.V. Devan Nair warned the Singapore trade unionists against this
"British disease" in a major policy speech of September 30, 1972. He
then called for a "cooperative working community", and for unions
"policing jobs" and "assuming responsibility for workers' job perfor-
mance". Then he threatened that any union member who would
not do this "... would suffer all the social and natural disadvantages
resulting from his non-participation".- 22 -
It would seem therefore that trade unionism and industrial relations in
Singapore are in fact moving to something akin to those in the Soviet
Union. Investors, however, love that situation and this has brought
much foreign investment, business and employment to Singapore. To that
extent peaceful industrial relations have contributed to the remarkable
economic growth of Singapore in the recent years. Thus it is probable
that untimately the Singapore workers (like the Japanese ones in the
past) will be better off than they would be under a more militant sys-
tem. Japan outstripped the British income per head a few years ago.
Singapore with the present growth rates will reach the present British
income per head in a few years' time. It would thus seem that there
are two diametrically opposed roads to workers' welfare.
14. National Economic Planning
Singapore made up only one National Economic Plan 1961-65. It was
essentially an indicative plan with implementation confined only to
the public sector. The Economic Planning Unit was monitoring the per-
formance of the economy and at the end of the period there was a
review. However, during the currency of the Plan great discrepancies
occurred between the Plan and the turn-out, because of such events as
the Indonesian "Confrontation" (1963-1965), the break up of the
Malaysian Federation (1965) and of the ''common market", and the British
decision to close down the economically important military bases. As
a result the pragmatic Singapore Government closed down the Economic
Planning Unit, and stopped making comprehensive economic plans.- 23 -
Part II: Export Performance of Singapore, 1960-1971
1. Inadequacies of Trade Statistics
The official international trade statistics for Singapore over the
last decade have six severe weaknesses for any serious, especially
a quantitative study. Firstly, since 1964 they (and of course the
U.M. statistics) exclude altogether trade with Indonesia, Singapore's
probably most important trade partner, or at least the second-most
important . The reasons for this official exclusion is that the
Singapore Government tries very hard to avoid embarrassing the Indonesian
Government. The Indonesian Government has an extremely wide and deep
system of trade and foreign exchange controls which are ineffectively
enforced by the government. The Indonesian Government's trade
statistics (and foreign exchange transactions) include only those
quantities which pass through the official permit system. The vast
majority of Indonesia's trade with Singapore does not go through the
Indonesian licensing system because the system of controls is so dras-
tic that merchants have very powerful inducements to escape outside
that straitjacket. If Singapore published its figures (and even its
own official figures might understate the values involved) it would
embarrass the Indonesian Government greatly because it would expose
the inefficiency of the Indonesian controls. The bulk of trade of
Indonesia with Singapore takes the form of smuggling goods out of and
into Indonesia. The multiplicity of Indonesian islands and the
proximity of Singapore's shores makes any controls very difficult to
operate. The other feature of that unofficial trade is that it is
barter: Indonesian raw-materials are swapped against manufactured
goods (capital goods, consumer goods) some of x^hich are Singapore's
re-exports, and some of which are Singapore's "domestic exports". This
unofficial barter trade by-passes the Indonesian import licensing,
tariffs and foreign exchange controls and makes the smugglers' boat
fully used on both legs of the trip.- 24 -
TABLE 2
SINGAPORE'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, i960 AND 1966-1971
(Million Dollars)
Categories























































































































































































































































































Source: Padret Speech of the Minister of Finance, March 1972.- 25 -
The smuggling was given a powerful boost by President Soekarno's 'Con-
frontation policy" against Malaysia (1963-65) as the policy imposed a
complete Indonesian embargo on trade with Singapore (then a part of
Malaysia). Although the embargo was removed in 1965, the existence of
other controls makes smuggling a very attractive proposition. The
embargo, no doubt, reduced the total volume of exchanges between the
two countries although it increased the unofficial exchanges. This
is the second factor making time series trade statistics rather unus-
able for any mathematical trend treatment.
The third factor was negotiations (1963-66) between Singapore and West
Malaysia about formation of a common market and their failure. Indus-
trialization in Singapore was temporarily quickened by the prospect
of the common market, exports of some products to West Malaysia rose,
and then dropped with the failure of the common market arrangements
and the imposition of tariffs by West Malaysia.
Singapore's total official exports, that is entrepot exports (re-
exports) plus the exports proper (called in the Singapore English
"domestic exports") are shown in Table 2. An inspection, however, of
Table 2 casts some doubt about the plausibility of the preceding
figures representing accurately total exports. The item called "Balan-
cing Item", normally called "Errors and Omissions" in international
statistics, amounts in this Table for 1971 to over 3 billion Singapore
dollars or practically a half of Singapore's total exports, or one
third of the value of Singapore's imports in that year. Without this
item (or what the item stands for) the Singapore balance of payments
would be in a fundamental disequilibrium. This item covers handsomely
the enormous deficit in Singapore's Current Account. As this "Balan-
cing Item" is given after non-monetary capital flow and is so vast,
one has to conclude, that even if one allows for the usual "errors- 26 -
and omissions" the bulk of this item must stand for the (at present)
very large favourable unrecorded balance of trade with Indonesia.
The fact that this "Balancing Item" grew so rapidly into that extra-
ordinary figure, since the end of the "Confrontation", and during a
period of economic recovery of Indonesia from the economic mismanage-
ment by Soekarno (see Table 2). strongly suggests the above view.
Since this item reflects only the balance of trade with Indonesia it
is impossible to guess the size of exports, given the fact that figures
for imports from Indonesia are not published either. But what is
clear is that exports (entrepot and "domestic") must be vast to give
so large a net balance. Consistently with the intention to suppress
Indonesian trade in the by-country statistics, commodity statistics
also exclude dealings with Indonesia. Thus one can only guess what
might be the composition and size of Singapore's exports to Indonesia.
There is a tendency in Singapore to think that most or much of this
trade is re-exports of capital goods, but once we realise the facts
of a general inflationary demand in Indonesia, and that the Indonesian
import control system would favour (official) imports of capital goods,
but would fall heavily on consumer goods, it is obvious that consumer
goods must loom large in the smuggling. Given the fact that Singapore
supplies now some capital goods and plenty of consumer goods (of the
"luxury" type) it is probable that the so-called "domestic exports" of
Singapore loom large in that trade.
The next qualification about the use to which the recent trade statis-
tics of Singapore can be put arises from the fact that Singapore (like
Taiwan and Japan) has greatly expanded its exports to Vietnam in the
last decade, supplying both consumer goods, and materials needed by the
armed forces in Vietnam (mainly petroleum products). While in 1961
Singapore's exports to Vietnam represented a little over 1 per cent of
Singapore's total exports, by 1969 at S$447.5 million they represented
practically 10 per cent of Singapore's total exports(Table 3). -^-inca^then theTABLE 3






















































































































































































































































































'i-ce: Vearbosk of Statistics; Singapore 19T1/72, Se;jnri:snt of Statistics, Singapore,
ote: Exports to Indonesia Dre not included in this Toble, not even anong the item "Other Countries".
I- 28 -
de-escalation of military activities in Vietnam has reversed the marked
growth of Singapore exports to Vietnam into a decline. The arrival of
peace in Vietnam will eliminate much of this trade. Whether Singapore
will become a supplier to Vietnam of capital goods for the development
of that country will depend on many political conditions, but is not
particularly likely.
A substantial portion of Singapore's exports does not get caught in
the statistician's net because the goods involved are taken by tour-
ists in their personal luggage for which no declaration is made. In
the last ten years "tourist" expenditures are estimated to have risen
from about 1.5 per cent of GDP to about 5 per cent, or to S$300 million.
Given the fact that on average the tourist stays about 3 days and
assuming that on average he spends $50-a day ($2Q room, $ 20 meals,
$10 extras and taxis) he would spend less than $200 on tourism proper
during his stay. For over 600 thousand visitors this would give ,S$120
million. Consequently the balance of their expenditures, S$180 million,
would go for manufactured goods that would be "exported" by the tour-
ist. This figure is higher than Singapore's total exports to Thailand
(S$160 million in 1971) and somewhat lower than those to Australia (S$
257 million). Further, for some time one can expect a growth of this
item. Recent growth has certainly been fast.
The other important omission from the official exports figures is the
value of ship-repair and servicing. (The ships built are included in
'Exports", but they are a very small, even though rising proportion
of shipyard business). Ship-repair and servicing, on the other hand,
is reported in the balance of payments statistics together with other
items under "Services". But as an industry it is already a vast one
and it does not differ in any essential way from manufacturing and, in
addition,industry sources estimate that over 80 per cent of the work
done, is for foreign shipowners, thus it must be classified as exports.- 29 -
TABLE 4 V '
SINGAPORE'S ESTIMATED SHIP-REPAIR REVENUE
(Mill. S-$)

















Other than the "Big Three"
Total 41 51 72 80 97 141 183
Source: The Economist intelligence Unit (S.E. Asia)
The Economist Intelligence Unit forecast the total revenue of ship-repair
to grow to S$ 273 million in 1974, SjS 408 million in 1977 and S$ 535
million in 1980.
2. The Role of Exports in the Development Process of Singapore
Given the qualifications about the coverage of the official published
statistics on exports, discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is
clear that such statistics have a limited value. Nonetheless they tend
to reveal some trends which after dome sort of allowance for the
distortions, are of interest. The first point to make is that Singapore's
tremendous growth of exports went pari passu with a tremendous growth of
all economic aggregates, saving, investment, GMP and others. Tables 5 and 6
give data on this remarkable growth.
Not only that total exports of Singapore are large (when compared to GDP)
but even the particular part of them, re-exports, usually called "entrepot
exports" make a very large contribution to the generation of GDP.
It can be seen from the following Tables 5 and 6 that in the year 1960
(and of course, before) pure entrepot exports contributed more to GDPTABLE S
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL SOURCE
fiotes: *fi'j'jres for 1969 have been revised on hlest available data in respect of the construction industry.
**
!!Oo?!estic trade" comprises internal trace as well as "dor.estic exporting". (This note is added by the present writer).
Sources: (a) Yearbook of Statistics: Singapore 1971/72, Chief Statistician, Governnent of Singapore,
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PERCENTAGE SHARE OF G.D.P. BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN, 1960-1971
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*"Co"cstic trade" comprises internal trade as well as "domestic exporting". (This
Sources: (a) Budiet Speech of ths Minister of Finance, I-iarch 1972.
(b) Vfrarcrck of Statistics: Sirrapcre 197J/72, Chief Statistician, Government of
note is added by trie present writer).
Singapore.- 32 -
than did manufacturing and quarrying taken together. According to the
Table 5 in 1964 the contribution to GDP of the entrepot trade was over-
taken by the combined contribution of manufacturing and quarrying.
However, two factors came to distort the trend in 1964. Firstly, 1964
was the first full year of Soekarno's "Confrontation" policy, which
would have reduced somewhat Singapore's actual entrepot exports to
Indonesia. The second one was purely "statistical" in the sense that
an important part of entrepot trade, that is the part directed to
Indonesia, was suppressed in Singapore's publications in 1964. In the
Tables 5 and 6 it was, of course, only the second factor that exerted
an influence, in actual developments only the first one. The "Confron-
tation" policy and the trade embargo on Singapore goods were discontinued
in 1965 and therefore Singapore's exports to Indonesia would have
picked up. After the fall of Soekarno, the Indonesian economy has
recovered, and thanks to this Singapore's exports and re-exports to
Indonesia would have grown fast, although still hampered somewhat by
the general system of import control. Although under the circumstances
one cannot be sure, it is probable that manufacturing and quarrying
taken together have come to equal the contribution to GDP made by "en-
trepot exports" only by 1971. This feature of the Singapore economy
is merely a reflection of the fact that all services continue to con-
tribute to the GDP a great deal more than the production of goods, in
particular in 1960 all services contributed 82.7 per cent of GDP and
in 1971 the figure was 68.6 per cent.(Table 6).
Inspection of Table 7 shows several important developments in the field
of Singapore manufacturing and exports of manufactures. The first row
(A) shows a very rapid growth of "domestic exports" in the last
decade. This series of figures for "domestic exports" is made up by
the Government Statistics Department from export declarations. Since
1964 this series excludes exports to Indonesia. Otherwise, this series
is practically all exports of all manufactures (by manufacturers or byTABLE 7
"DOMESTIC EXPORTS", MANUFACTURING OUTPUT AND DIRECT MANUFACTURING EXPORTS
(A) Total "docestic exports
M*(Si Million)
(B) Value of manufacturing output (S3 Million)
(C) * increase in nanufacturin: cvsr preceding year
(0) Direct exports of manufactured products (35 Million)
(0 % increase in direct exports over preceding year
(F) Apparent export orientation of output ( •g- ) %
(G) "Unexported" manufactured output (B - !)) (Sii Million)
(H) Plausible dor.c-stic use of canufacto-red goods'* (S3 Million)
(I) Change in manufactured stocks during year (Si Million)
























































































































Notes; '"Domestic exports" excludes bunker fuels and processed re-exports.
**T';s ass'jnptionSfor estimation of "olcusible domestic use of manufactured goods" are given in the text.
Sources: Reports on the Census of Industrial Production, 1%G - 1970.
Annual Roperts of the E.D.B.
Budget Speech of tiie Minister of finance, March 1972.
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merchants) since primary product exports are negligible, and since it
excludes bunker fuels and processed re-exports.
Row B and C show the spectacular growth of manufacturing in Singapore
in the last decade. These figures are based on an annual census of
manufacturing production. In most of the years the increases over the
preceding year were over 20 per cent, and in one year 1969, the increase
was an extraordinary 48 per cent.
Rows D and E sho\tf an almost equally fast growth of "direct export" by
the manufacturers. "Direct export" figures are also obtained from
the annual census of manufacturing and since there is no division
there by country, exports to Indonesia are not excluded in principle.
But manufacturers do not participate much in the "unofficial exports"
to Indonesia. This type of business is done by Singapore merchants who
often do barter deals with the Indonesian merchants. The "direct
export" figures of manufactured goods show, however, so great varia-
bility in the growth rate that they are suspect on that ground alone:
in one year they grew by under 3 per cent and in another year they
grew by an incredible 111 per cent.
Row F shows the "apparent" export-orientation of Singapore manufactur-
ing, and since it is easy to find production and "direct export" data
in the annual census of manufacturing by the I.S.I.C. breakdown it is
attractive at first sight, but given the greatly incomplete coverage
of the export figures in the row D, its attraction wanes. None the
less it is clear enough that Singapore manufacturing is highly export-
oriented, especially in view of the fact that the export data are
understated.
Row G gives figures for the portion of manufactured goods that were
not exported directly by the manufacturer. The very uneven growth of
figures in this row (G), from 1963 to 1965 the first jump, and the
second jump after 1966, suggests that the first jump is explainable by- 35 -
a shift of a proportion of output that would normally have been
exported openly to Indonesia into unofficial exports (from the point
of view of Singapore) and smuggling into Indonesia (from the point of
view of Indonesia) of embargoed Singapore goods under Soekarno's
period of "Confrontation". The second jump, probably reflects econo-
mic recovery in Indonesia after 1966 and Singapore's increased capa-
city to supply Indonesia's needs for manufactured goods of all kinds.
In a rough attempt to gauge the possible values of these unreported
exports the Table 7 row H gives estimates of "plausible domestic use"
in Singapore of the "unexported" manufacturing output. An assumption
was made there that in Singapore the domestic "consumption" of manu-
factured goods between 1960-1970 grew at the same rate as grew total
private consumption expenditure, i.e., 7.6 per cent p.a. Given the
facts that nutrition levels and total private educational expenditures
grew very rapidly in Singapore in that period perhaps the assumption
is not far wrong.
Row I of the Table 7 gives changes in stocks of finished manufactured
goods held by manufacturers (from the census). Thus, in the end row J
gives the portion of manufacturing output that is not accounted for,
so far. Again there are two distinct periods noticeable, the "Con-
frontation" and the subsequent economic recovery in Indonesia. What
is significant and telling is that in the "Confrontation" years 1963,
1964 and 1965 when Soekarno put an official ban on all Singapore goods
the increases in stocks of finished manufactured goods held by
Singapore merchants were negligible. This would suggest that Soekarno's
ban did not in fact give the Singapore manufacturers much trouble.
The merchants carried on their exports as usual, except that their
trade became completely unofficial.
The very high values for the unaccounted for manufactured products,
especially after 1966 can be explained (accounted for) mainly by the
unreported Singapore exports to Indonesia, partly by the value of
manufactured goods taken out of Singapore by tourists (tourism has
grown rapidly) and to a much smaller extent may be due to an increase
in indirect exporting by merchants.- 36 -
3. Foreign Capital in Manufacturing and Exporting
The entry of foreign capital into manufacturing (and therefore also
exporting) is a quite new phenomenon in Singapore. For many years in
the past there were only a few firms with foreign shareholders. The
foreign shareholders were portfolio investors, and being small and spread
all over the world, did not exert any influence on the company. They
were mainly in the food processing and beverage industries. The
modern foreign investor in Singapore is usually a different type, an
individual, or more often a company abroad who takes an active
interest in the organisation of production and marketing, who provides
not only capital but also some know-how.
TABLE 8
FOREIGN CAEITAL
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The Table 8 gives foreign capital holding in Singapore manufacturing
at the end of 1970 as amounting to S$l,749 million. However, more
than a half of this investment was made only in 1970. The German and
Japanese investor's entry in particular is very recent and can be
expected to rise in near future. The other interesting feature of
this Table is that Taiwan's investment is not high enough to merit a
place of its own. This surprising picture is due to the fact that
investment is shown in the Table by value of capital, and not by the
number of firms, managers of foreign origin or skilled workers. In
the subsequent sample survey, Taiwanese investment looms large (See
Part III).
TABLE 9
FOREIGN CAPITAL IN MANUFACTURING BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP AT END OF 1970
Investment Total Foreign Per cent of
Foreign Capital Commitment at Capital at Total foreign
INDUSTRY at end of 1970 end of 1970 end of 1970 Investment in

























































As the preceding Table 9 shows, more than half of the foreign invest-
ment in Singapore went into petroleum industry which is completely
foreign-owned. That industry in Singapore already services much of
the region and is not very likely to grow much unless it moves from
refining into petro-chemicals. In "transport equipment", i.e.,
vehicles, foreign capital is also dominant. In shipyards, however,
(not included in the Table because they are classified as providing
"Services") foreign investment is small (mainly Japanese). In ship-
yards the Singapore Government is the main owner. Foreign capital
is also strongly represented in tobacco manufacturing, non-metallic
mineral products, basic metals and electronics.
A recent study gives the data for partly and wholly foreign-owned
firms in several aspects of Singapore manufacturing as follows:-
Number of firms 25.2%




There are some conclusions that can, and some that cannot be drawn
from the above Table. Firstly, the average foreign firm is in terms
of employment, and value of output somewhat more than twice as large
as the domestic-owned firm. The firm with foreign capital is slightly
less labour-intensive than the fully Singapore-owned one. It cannot
be concluded that, other things being equal, it pays higher wages than
the ruling market rates for various skills. Its share in the total
manufacturing wage bill is admittedly slightly higher than its share
See Chia Siow Yue, Export Performance and Foreign Manufacturing in
Singapore, cyclostyled paper. """" Chia gives as her source "Statis-
tics Department, Census of Industrial Production 1970". However,
till the day of x/riting the present paper, the Statistics Department
has not carried out any such study. The findings therefore must be
taken as those of Mrs. Chia, not of the Statistics Department.- 39 -
of labour, but in all probability it tends to employ different (higher)
grades of skills. This can be easily seen from the fact that average
wage bill per employee in petroleum industry, a fully-foreign owned
one, but a high skill one, is higher than the national figure.
Finally, the share of "direct exports" held by companies xd.th some
foreign capital, 83.5 per cent, cannot be viewed as their true per-
centage share in all manufactured exports, although the true share is
probably fairly high. It stands to reason that a company with a
foreign parent or sister company would have an easy access to direct
exporting. It is highly probable that companies with foreign capital
association rely less on local trading companies (indirect exporting),
and probably also have a lower share of their output sold to the for-
eign tourists.
Department of Statistics,,Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore 1971/72,




1. The Nature of the Sample
For the purpose of finding out the characteristic features of Singa-
pore manufacturer-exporters, the problems that they meets and the
pattern of their behaviour, a sample of the firms concerned was
interviewed in depth by the writer. The sample, a random one, was
2 taken out of a total of 772 manufacturer-exporters who had applied
to the Ministry of Finance for certificate that their product is of
"domestic origin", and got one- The sample was made up of 29 manu-
facturer-exporter firmss of which 20 had, or have "pioneer status",
9 "non-pioneer" manufacturer-exporter firms, and in addition it in-
cluded 4 shipyard firms (which are in a somewhat special category
and are not discussed in this section). This larger proportion of
"pioneer" firms was put into the sample deliberately although the
proportion is not based on any exact criterion. In 1969 "pioneer"
firms represented by number of firms, about one-seventh of all
manufacturer firms employing 10 workers or more, yet the value of
their output was almost a half of the total manufacturing output,
but correspondingly the number of their employees was also almost
The questionaire used was basically that prepared by Dr. J.B.Donges
of-the JKiel Institute with only' minor alterations'." "
 :
 L" '• ' ~ *
2
It should be noted that the latest figure available for the number
of the manufacturers is for 1970 and it amounts to 1,825 firms in
total (Source: Ministry of Culture, Singapore Facts and Pictures,
p. 36) but the balance either did not exnort at all, or did not qualify
for the certificate of "domestic origin".
"Domestic origin" is defined by the Singapore Government as a product
with at least 25 per cent of value originated in Singapore. Exports
of such firms are called in the Singapore English "domestic exports".
Exports of products that do not meet this criterion are called "re-
exports" or entrepot exports. In Singapore conditions this classifi-
cation can sometimes be important.- 41 -
a half of the total employment in manufacturing. The "gross value
added" r>er employee was only slightly higher among the "pioneers"
than among the
 nnon-t>ioneers", on the other hand "direct" exports
per employee were about 50 per cent higher among "pioneers
1
1 than
among all manufacturers. Since then the "pioneer" firms would have
increased their number of firms (because of new awards of the
status),value of output and value of exports (because both of new
entrants' activities, and because of the older entrants reaching
for their maturity outnut). Since the award of the "pioneer status"
may have some at least psychological influence, stimulating the
future growth of the approved categories of industriess it would be
reasonable to give stronger representation to
 :'pioneer
!
i firms in the
sample than certainly their present number, or even present output




activity (current and exnected) it was impossible to find any defen-
sible weighting for them. Thus the ''pioneer" firms (still chosen st
random) were given arbitrarily stronger representation. This un-
avoidable
1 arbitrariness probably does not make much difference because
no significant differences emerge between the "pioneers" and other
firmsj except for size, and export value per employee (the latter
can be expected to grow as the new firms come into full swing and full
use of their facilities).
Very few of the approached manufacturer-exporter firms showed
reluctance to be interviewed. Those that agreed to be interviewed
gave co-operation to the best of their ability, except that they xrere
sometimes unable and sometimes unwilling to give figures on value
added and the related data.- 42 -
2. Specific Findings About Sampled Firms
Age
As one expect from the fact that industrialisation of Singapore
started from around the date of obtaining independence (1965) all
the firms in the sample were of the independence vintage except for
four firms which were of quite old vintage (over 20 years). Again,
not very surprisingly there was not much difference in the average,
or the most frequent age, of the "pioneers" and "non-pioneers" except
that of the four old firms (over 20 years) three were "non-pioneers"s
and among "pioneers" only one was over 20 years old . The typical
age would be five years or younger with three years most common, both
among "pioneers" and "non-pioneers".
The importance of "pioneer status"
The total number of firms with "pioneer status" was 322 at the end
of 1971. In the sample there were 20. In the answer to the question
"...whether pioneer status was important for them3 that is whether
without it the policy of the company would have been any different,"
there was the following response:
3 firms said "not relevant at all";
A firms said "not important";
10 firms said • "not very important";
(Two of these said that the only benefit stemming from "pioneer"
status was the non-statutory, de facto, privilege of exemption from
tariffs on inputs. But such exemption could have been obtained by
non-pioneers too.)- 43 -
The total of negativ answers about the influence of "pioneer status"
was thus 17. Only three companies in the "pioneers" sample attached
any importance to the status, two of them (one American, the other
Taiwanese) said that without the status they might not have come and
the third said that the status was "fairly important" to them. All
of the three, as one would expect from the answer5were fairly
successful (they worked 3 shifts). One of these two firms that found
the "pioneer" status important, said in justification that the
Singapore Government promised them that the Government would, not
allow a new firm in the same industry without their permission.
This was probably misunderstanding: the most the Government could have
done would have been to refuse to the potential second-entrant any
"pioneer status".
Conclusion:
Judging by the sample it is clear that "pioneer status" was an
important factor in entrepreneurial decision-making only in a few
isolated exceptional cases perhaps 10 per cent of the 322 pioneer
firms in all. Although those few, 10 per cent, were influenced by
the award of the status the influence was probably mainly psycholo-
gical: the two foreign firms in the sample were influenced more by
this sign of welcome than the prospect of income tax saving (in the
difficult formativ first 5 years). The American firm said that their
alternativ location was a European country "with bad industrial
relations."- 44 -
The number of shifts worked
The number of shifts worked is an indicator of firms's profitability
and demand for its product. On occasion the firms used as an
excuse for the absence of a second or a third shift "the shortage
of skilled labour". However, although a shortage of skilled labour
is appearing in Singapore taken as a whole, not profitable single
firm need go short of labour if it is prepared, and able to nay a
somewhat higher wage rate than the ruling one in that industry for
that shift. Thus this argument of "shortage of labour" at the micro-
economic level has to be reduced in most cases to shortage of
adequate demand and profit margin. A textile and one fibreglass firm
argued that one shift is "normal in that industry
5' because of problems
about quality control. (In view of the very great importance of quality
control9 shown elsewhere in the survey, this argument appears sound.)
One firm in electronic components argued that it would be cheaner
for them to shift that amount of production to Malaysia rather than
pay the required rates of wages for the second shift in Singapore.
Those firms that had only two shifts tended to argue that "as the second
shift usually ends in Singapore at 11 p.m. the third shift is very
unpopular with the workers". The meaning of this would be that a very
high bonus would have to be paid (S# 2.90) to overcome the reluctance
to work the third shift.
The average number of shifts worked per firm in the whole sample of
<29 firms, excluding the shipyards! (after making a rough allowance
for such statements as: 2 shifts in some sections and 3 shifts in
other), was almost two shifts, but while for "pioneer" firms it was
slightly over two shifts on average for a firm, for non-pioneer firms- 45 -
it was only 1.6 shifts per firm on average. This suggests that "pioneer"
firms are more profitable and happen to have a livelier demand for their
products than do the non-pioneers. If one divides the whole sample (29)
into those firms with some foreign capital (24) and thos without (5),
the firms with foreign shareholders have a slightly higher average
for the number of shifts worked (2.0 shifts), than the firms without
foreign shareholders (average 1.8). The difference is slight and while
it could have come by chance, it tends to suggest that firms with
some foreign shareholders have s better market and perhaps better
profits. There is a slight independent support for this view too in
the fact that the respondents with foreign shareholders frequently
admitted foreign assistance in marketing abroad.
"Non-pioneers".
Among the nine non-pioneer companies there is a noticeable pattern
of stagnation in most matters, with one notable exception, however, in
the matter of exports, where most companies expect a very lively growth.
But it would appear that the companies are doing little to improve
themselves (except for some training of workers). The companies seem
to depend on the initial input of capital and know-how. Their current
and expected export successes, must therefore basically depend on the
cheapness of labour or some other once-and-for-all factors (more
about this later). In particular, only three out of the nine non-
pioneer companies made any new investment last year. Only one (of
the three making new investment) made any significant effort in experi-
mentation (referred to in Table 10 as "Research"). Only one Company
out of nine spent a substantial sum of money on "research" or experi-
mentation. It was a substantially foreign-owned one. Of the remainingTABLE 10










































































































five firms with some foreign capital two spent nothing on experimenta-
tion, and three spent trivial sums (or time). It should be noted that
all of these five companies had foreign ownership at a level that
could give full control. The fully domestically-owned non-pioneer
firms have an even poorer record in this matter. Of the three of
them, two spent nothing on experimentation, and one a trivial sum.
This attitude suggests that the Singapore Government's often avowed
intention of developing high-skill, modern industries, and turning
Singapore into a "Switzerland of the East" may in future strike
trouble, as soon as wages in Singapore pick up to the level of the
developed countries.
Two out of the nine companies did not expect any increase in exports
in the next three years but the remaining seven expected increases
from 10 per cent to 125 per cent.
"Pioneers"
The composite picture of a "pioneer status" company that is in ex-
porting field, shows some unexpected features (see Table 11). Firstly,
out of the 20 "pioneers" in the sample only two companies or 10 per
cent, are entirely domestically-owned, and in at least 14 cases (out
of 20) it must be presumed that the company is foreign-controlled
(on major issues) because the foreign shareholding amounts to 40
per cent, or more, of the capital stock. In 6 cases out of 20
exporting "pioneers" the company is 100 per cent foreign owned. It
is thus clear that the Singapore Government has not insisted yet on
local equity share in the capital even in the "pioneer" companies, not
to mention that it has not insisted on this point for the companies
at large.
The government has been afraid that any such insistence might hamper
to entry of foreign firms and especially those with the latest
know-how (the most desirable ones). The government thinks that
foreign firms would up-grade the skills of Singaporeans.TABLE }1
SALIENT FEATURES OF "PIONEER-STATUS" FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE
Product of Firm
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On the basis of this sample one is entitled to think that 90 per
cent of all "pioneer status" companies that export are at least
partly foreign-owned, and almost 33 per cent completely foreign-owned.
This sample finding is supported by (or supports) data for all the
"pioneer status" companies given to the writer informally by the
Economic Research Division of the Government of Singapore. According
to those data out of 322 of all "pioneer status" companies (at the end
of 1971) only 62 (roughly 20 per cent) were fully Singapore-owned.
It would be easy, however, to misconstrue the sample findings. The
sample covered only the firms that do export. Its findings that the
vast majority (90 per cent) of "pioneers" who export was foreign-owned
merely reflected the predominance of foreign-owned comapnies among
pioneers. It does not say that a foreign-owned company is more likely
2 to export. If one goes outside the sampled list of exporters into the
list of all "pioneer status" firms and divides them into those
completely Singapore-owned and those at least partly foreign-owned, and
then one makes a check company by company against the list of exporters
("domestic origin") it transpires that there is no significant difference
in the export-proneness between the domestically-owned and foreign-
owned "pioneer status" firms. To be precise, among all the 322
"pioneers" 202 companies, i.e. 63 per cent did not have any exports and
This incidentally, shows that the Singapore Government does not have
any xenophobia and lives up to its "global city" slogan.
2
This issue is simply left unresolved, because for this answer it
would be necessary to relate the numbers of exporters among the total
number of manufacturers, foreign and domestic. It is probable, however,
that foreign-owned firms are much more export-prone. This writer has a
complete current list of all exporters ("domestic origin") and the
number of all manufacturing comanies, but the list of all exporters
cannot be economically divided into foreign- end domestically-owned.- 50 -
among the 260 "pioneers" that have some foreign capital 159, i.e.
61 per cent were not on the list of exporters.
However, this finding about the relatively low export-proneness
of "pioneers" requires further caveats. Firstly, if one could isolate
the "pioneers" with a substantial foreign equity one would probably
find the incidence of exporting and the level of exporting, to be
very high compared to "pioneers" that are wholly Singapore-owned.
Above all, the findings will have to be adjusted in future because
since 1970 the Singapore Government has introduced as a criterion for
granting "pioneers status" the possession of adequate foreign market
connections. Thus when the last generation of "pioneers" loses its
status and the new generation emerges one could expect a substantial
increase in the export-proneness, and the percentage of output
exported, among the new generation of "pioneers".
Table 11 also shows that the "pioneers", like the non-pioneers, have
rarely added to their capital equipment in the last year, but perhaps
this is more excusable in the case of the "pioneers" who had to make a
substantial investment for qualifying the pioneer status. However, the
"pioneers" expenditure on "research" (experimentation) is even more
disappointing than that of non-pioneers. Among "pioneers" 65 per cent
of firms had no experimentation of any kind (whereas among non-pioneers
only 33 per cent had no experimentation). This difference is partly
explainable by the fact that the incidence of foreign-capital among
"pioneers" is much higher (90 %) than among non-pioneers (66 %).
The firm with foreign capital has brought with it the latest foreign
know-how developed by the parent company and does not yet feel the need
to experiment. In fact, one or two respondents apologetically stated- 51 -
that their parent firm does their research for them. However, this is
not a justification good enough. The need for experimentation is not
limited to technical processes only (where the parent might some-
times be adequate) it extends to the whole gamut of organisational
features of the company and its marketing. In those areas the parent
company could hardly help. Given the avowed and justifiable ambitions
of the Singapore Government to develop industrial excellence in
Singapore experimentation will need to acquire greater emphasis.
A comparison of Tables 10 and 11 shows that "pioneer status" companies
are substantially larger than non-"pioneers" in terms of the labour
force or the value of capital. Nine, that is almost a half of the
"pioneers" have capital amounting to millions of Singapore dollars
and yet of those nine firms five have no (or "little") experimentation
going on. One would have thought that a newly expanding firm, with
capital assets over a million of Singapore dollars, could mount some
experimentation programme, and would find it profitable.
As for training the workers,the firms quantitatively speaking, perform
not too badly, especially the "pioneers", where in 8 firms out of
20 the proportion of skilled workers has been increased (often,
but not always, by own training).
In the field of exporting, however, the expectations of management
are most lively among the "pioneers". There are only 4 firms, out of
20, that did not expect an increase in exports in the next 3 years
(and in those cases there was usually an unfavourable external fortuitous
check such as a foreign government decision not to reduce the tariff,- 52 -
or world-wide over-production, or establishment of a competing industry
in the foreign market). The typical firm in the "pioneers" group
expects increases in exports in the next 3 years of 20 % or more, and
3 out of 20 firms expect increases of a multiple of the present
export value.
It is interesting to note that there is a tendency among the
sampled "pioneers" for low export expectations by the firm to go
together with a lack of experimentation effort. Also, the very large
increases in expected exports have been voiced by companies with very
high share of foreign capital.
Degree of Export-Orientedness
An export-oriented company may be defined, admittedly in a somewhat
arbitrary fashion, as one which exports say, 90 per cent or more of
its output. The questionnaire inquiry shows conclusively that
Singapore manufacturing is highly export-oriented. More than half
of the non-"pioneer" firms in the sample were export-oriented on
that definition. In fact, those companies' sales in the domestic
market were confined mainly to that proportion of output that did
not pass quality control, that is rejects and seconds. In the case
of "pioneer" firms the proportion of the export-oriented was 9 out
of 20 (with another company at 80 % almost qualifying). There were
four companies in the sample which sold all their output, abroad
and one or two which even began business that way. Thus Singapore
provides a direct contradiction to the view of Staffan Burenstam
Linder who argued that for the development of manufactured exports
a substantial domestic base is essential. Indeed, in the view of- 53 -
the Chairman of the Development Bank of Singapore, Singapore
manufacturing firms can be divided into three categories.
(a) Those that switched into manufacturing from old commercial
activities. They do not do well.
(b) Those other that were set up to supply the domestic market.
They do not do well either.
(c) Those that were set up to sell in export markets. They
do well.
Of course, if there is a substantial domestic market, the manufacturer
would be foolish to ignore it. Thus Linder observing various developed
countries, that is with large domastic markets in terms of purchasing
power, could not help noticing that exporting went together in the
large domestic market, but this does not prove the Linder thesis.
Export, after the export drive has become even a small success,
contributes so much to the general development of the country and its
income that domastic market does indeed come to loom large. It
should be added here that this "ex-post" effect is not something
distant, but like a shadow directly chases the rising exports.Table 12
























































































































































































































































over BO- 56 -
The preceeding two Tables 12 and 13 show that the average export-
orientedness of all the companies in the sample is 64 % of output,
but for the "non-pioneers" the percentage is slightly higher than
the overall average at 69 %, whereas for the "pioneers" it is
slightly lower than the average at 62 %. The "pioneers", however,
have an expectation of a slight rise in their export-orientedness in
the next 3 years (by 1975). These two facts of slightly lower present
export-orientedness of "pioneer" firms and their expectation of a
slight increase in their export-orientedness in the next few years
may be connected to the fact that the average age of the company in
the "non-pioneer" group is at least twice as high as the average age
of a "pioneer" firm (age of firm, not of the "pioneer status").
Alternatively, or conjointly, these facts of lower export-orientedness
among "pioneers" than among "non-pioneers" may be due to the fact that
the "non-pioneers" suffer more from shortage of demand for their
products than the "pioneers" do (witness the fact that the average
number of shifts worked among "non-pioneers" is only 1.4, whereas for
the "pioneers" it is 2.1).
In other words "non-pioneers", pressed by the small market for
each of them, try harder to export.
This, of course, is not the export-orientedness of all Singapore
manufacturers, because the sample was taken out of exporting
manufacturers.- 57 T
The Country of the Foreign Investors
The number of companies with some foreign capital that got into the
sample was 25 out of a total of 29 in the sample. By country of origin




















(The total exceeds the number of companies with foreign capital
because in some cases firms from two foreign countries made a
joint investment).
In six cases of the Hong Kong and Taiwanese origin of capital
the raanager-entrepreneur came originally from Shanghai (before
World War II the most industrialised part of China). In three cases
the technique, or skilled workers came from Taiwan.
 (e ''en one joint
American-Dutch firm uses Taiwanese technique). The Taiwanese
influence in the area of supply of skilled workers would be even
larger, because some companies without any foreign capital (or some
that do not export and thus did not get any representation in the
sample) use Taiwanese skilled workers in training and in production.
Thus, the role of the "overseas Chinese" in the industrialisation
of Singapore) must be predominant. Adding together Hong Kong, Taiwan
and, say, three-quarters of Malaysia investors (who could be Chinese)
gives a tctal of 15 firms (out of a total of 29 firms in the sample
and out of this 25 with some foreign capital) financed and organised
at least partly by "overseas Chinase". Thus we can say, on the basis
of the samle, that the refugee capital and even more entrepreneurship
from China takes a substantial part in over a half of the exporting- 58 -
manufacturer firms (number of firms not value of exports) in Singapore.
Compared to that, the contribution of any other single national
group is quite minor.
When one compares the basic economic conditions (e.g. wage rates)
of Singapore with the country of residence of this majority of
foreign investors (i.e. "overseas Chinese") one must conclude that
the decisive attractions of Singapore could not have been cheap
wages (Taiwan, and Hong Kong have cheaper wages) or any other
economic factor, but Singapore's greater political stability and
security (and perhaps, compared to Taiwan,a less overwhelming system
of government control).
Innovative Vitality
The greater vitality and growth potential of the "pioneer" firms over
the "non-pioneer" is clearly reflected in the incidence of intentions
to start production of a new product, or products, "in the next three
years". In the case of "non-pioneers" only two firms out of nine
(22 per cent) had such intention, and in the case of "pioneers" 12
out of 20 firms (60 per cent). However, the figure for "pioneers"
may have been increased simply by great predominance of foreign firms in
the sample (reflecting, of course, the great predominance of firms
with foreign capital in the total "population" of "pioneer" firms).
Admittedly, however, among non-"pioneer" firms this greater innovative
attitude of firms with some foreign capital is not shown, but the
sample is so small that this could have come by accident. Be that as
it may, "pioneer" firms (whatever the cause) show much greater vitality
than "non-pioneer" in respect of intended product innovation. This is
perhaps the only really marked difference between "pioneers" and
"non-pioneers".- 5:9 "
Export Marketing Effort of the Sampled Firms
In order to find out the circumstances, problems, and efforts of the
companies in export marketing the companies were asked sets of questions
in the following areas:
(a) How do the firms obtain information about export markets?
The questions put to the firms and the frequency with which firms
mentioned the source of information are given below in Table 14.
TABLE 14
SOURCES OF MARKET INFORMATION
1
Through own representatives in the foreign country 20
Through the representatives of Singapore Government
abroad 3
Through participation in international fairs 4
Through the market studies of the Trade Division
(Ministry of Finance of Singapore) 1
Through foreign Chambers of Commerce of Singapore 7
one
Direct from foreign "associated" firms or persons 35
Through market research institutes 0
In other ways (please state the source):
Export trading company 2
Manager's own effort or travel 16
Foreign customers' advice 13
Foreign director and owner 1
Manufacturers' Association 1
If the firm stressed the source lightly one point was given,
if strongly two points were given, and if very strongly 3 points
were given. Where a firm quoted only one source 3 points were
given to that source anyway. Thus the figures given against the
various sources of information do not reveal so much the frequency
with which the source mentioned by the average firm, but rather the
weight attached to the source of information by the average firm.- 60 -
The preceding table reveals that foreign connection is considered
to be of overwhelming importance by the vast majority of firms.
The implication of this must be that firms with foreign capital
are likely to do better in exporting (although to some extent the
stress put on foreign connection arises from the fact that the
majority of the firms in the sample and therefore presumably
among exporters do in fact have some foreign capital).
Among the other sources of information the few most highly ranked
are: own representatives abroad, manager's own effort from his office
or travelling (16 points), foreign customer's own enquiry (13
points). The fact that the exporter-manufacturers rely so heavily
on the customer approach to them is surprising (especially in
an overseas Chinese setting, which is usually supposed to be highly
competitive). The foreign customer's enquiry being almost as im-
portant as manager's own direct efforts and not very much less
important than foreign agents of the firm, suggests that Singapore
manufacturers have rightly or wrongly not yet felt the need for a
strong export marketing drive. The customer is apparently responsible
for discovering that Singapore offers a bargain. Thus again, as in
the case of lack of attempts to make technological improvements,
there is in marketing a lack of sufficiently intensive export drive.
In both respects the manufacturers seem to ride on low wages and
therefore low prices. In future when Singapore costs rise, and in
particular as its exports move more into those non-standard products
where quality and therefore salesmanship are important, there will
be a need for a better marketing effort.- 61 -
(b) The most important factors affecting the ability to export
In the following Table 15 the firms' responses are given again
in the form of points from 0-3 where 0 means that a particular
feature has within limits no influence on the ability to export,
and where 3 points goes to a factor that was stressed very
strongly by the firm, or was the only factor in the opinion of the
firm.
It is clear from the companies' response that the managements
do not think that price is the most important factor. The
largest number of companies and with the strongest stress held
that quality and design of the product were by far the most
important. (In this connection it is important to mention that
several firms stressed on their own initiative the importance of
quality control, and the right decision about the choice of the
quality to be produced). Price of the product came to be practi-
cally of equal importance as the delivery time. When one considers
the fact that everybody in the world is indoctrinated with the ill-
understood economic principle about price affecting demand, one
is inclined to think that the firms' responses were influenced by
this factor, and that in the absence of this (not always correct)
indoctrination the number of firms stressing the importance of
price might have been smaller still. In good economic theory smallish
price movements affect demand only where demand is perfectly elastic
and that means under perfect competition. Thus where the product
is homogeneous with the products of competitors price is indeed
important, but that case is very rare in manufacturing.- 62 -
TABLE 15
FACTORS AFFECTING EXPORT LEVEL
Price of the product 25
Delivery time 22
Quality and design 41
Supplier's credit 5
Capacity utilization rate 0
Export promotion policies of the
Singapore Government 1
Restrictions on export by the
foreign shareholder 1
Other factors ("please state"):
Reputation of honesty and
reliability 3




Shortage of productive capacity 3
Good technology 1
Transport cost differential 3
Foreign associates A
Knowledge of markets 1
Personal contact abroad 1
Chinese language 1
Ability of supply small lots 1
Ancillary service 1
Neglect by owner-director 1
Tariff Preferences for L.D.C.'s 2
Availability of shipping 1
Intraco 1- 63 -
Noticeable are also the facts that only one firm mentioned the
influence of government assistance (referring to a trade mission),
and only two firms mentioned the Tariff Preferences.
The fact that Tariff Preferences for the Less Developed
Countries were given so slight a weight is explainable by the
"small print" of the "Generalized System of Preferences"
(G.S.P.), by its very recent dates of implementation by the
developed countries, and by the fact that as of the end of
1971 only 8 countries were actually giving the preference
(E.E.C. countries, Japan and Norway; Australia has been giving a
sort of very limited preference since 1966 but Singapore, would
hardly feel any of its benefits).
TABLE 16
THE USE OF G.S.P. MADE BY SINGAPORE; VALUE OF EXPORTS TO
VARIOUS COUNTRIES UNDER TARIFF CONCESSIONS
AUGUST 1971 - JUNE 1972












Source: Government of Singapore.
By April 1972 the following additional countries were effectively on
the list: U.K., Denmark, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Sweden,
Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Ireland, Austria and Bulgaria.- 64 -
By the "small print" of G.S.P. are meant various "domestic
origin" requirements which make it very difficult, especially
for Singapore, to qualify for the privilege, for example in the
case of transistor radios and other electronic products, there
are three-tier conditions which must be simultaneously met:
(1) minimum domestic content of the whole product 60 %.
(2) minimum local materials cost 50 %.
(3) maximum 5 per cent of the cost of the whole product
limit put on the imported components which are
classified under the same BTN code (for electronics
Code No. 85.15).
The minimum domestic content conditions might perhaps be
reasonable for a large developing country like Argentina or
Brazil with a great variety of resources, which could find most
of its raw materials and semi-finished inputs at home. For a
small country, however, like Singapore, which has to import
virtually all its raw-materials (and even some water) such
conditions make it excessively difficult to qualify for G.S.P.TABLE 17
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL SINGAPORE G.S.P.




and electronic articles 17.81
Fabric, garments 14.74
Metal scrap 12.88
Wigs, footwear, umbrellas 8.96




Source; Government of Singapore.- 66 -
(c) What Prevented the Firms from Exporting More?
The questions and responses are given below:
Shortage of labour 12
Shortage of capital k
Difficulties in obtaining inputs 6
Bureaucratic delays 0
Lack of knowledge of export markets 10
Inadequate sales network 13
Unfair practices by domestic export firms 2
Other reasons ("please state"):
Difficulty in communicating with
foreign buyer 1
Foreign trade barriers 1
Buyers' difficulty about obtaining
L. of C. in advance (payment with order,
time factor with big order) 1
Fault in foreign material inputs 1
Strike in the U.K. 1
Strike in U.S. ports 1
"Unfair competitive practices" of
Japanese firms 1
Restriction of foreign associates 1
Oversupply in world markets 1
Cometition in world markets, lack
of market 6
Young firm time needed to find export
markets 1
Training-labour bottleneck 1
Transport costs 1- 67 ••
These results, however, probably need some qualifications.
The most frequent and the third most frequent factors mentioned,
i.e., inadequate sales network, and lack of knowledge of export
markets (respectively) undoubtedly play a role, especially in
young companies, but they are also the kind of response that
any businessman, if modest enough, would give when asked for
reasons why he does not export more (especially if he cannot
find any better excuse). Perhaps these two questions should
not have been put into the questionnaire in their present form.
In any case, it is probably legitimate, in view of these
qualifications, to conclude that in fact the most important
barrier to expansion of exports has almost certainly been
shortage of labour. Nonetheless inadequate sales network
obviously must rank very high as a barrier to expansion of
experts, especially if we view this factor in the light of the
responses to an earlier set of questions about the sources
of information about export markets.
A corroboration of the answers of the sample respondents about
shortage of labour is found in Table 18 which shows quite
clearly that by 1971 labour has become scarce in Singapore
and certainly much scarcer than it used to be before, A rate
of unemployment of 4.8 per cent is nowadays considered low
in most countries (though much depends on how various countries
collect the data).TABLE 18
LABOUR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT





















































































Source: Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance, March 1972.- 69 -
As for the only one case of a firm admitting that restrictions
of the foreign parent or associated company has been a barrier
to greater exports, this must be considered a gross under-
statement. In answer to different questions in a different
part of the questionnaire 10 firms (out of 29 in the sample)
admitted the existence of a clause in the contract with the
foreign company restricting the rights to export in some
degree. In most of these cases the restriction referred to
a region, in a few cases all exports had to be "handled" by the
foreign company. We can thus assume that about one third of all
exporters ("domestic content") have a degree of contractual
limitation on the right to export. This contractual limitation
is probably less frequently operative in fact as a barrier, but
the respondents' answers in this matter are probably not reliable.
(d) What Are the Major Sources of the Firm's Export Competitiveness?
Perhaps this set of questions was not well chosen, or perhaps the
respondents had not themselves formulated any clear views in this
matter, but in general the answers did not provide any meaningful
and plausible pattern, except that 17 respondents out of 29 admitted
the importance of relatively low wages in Singapore, and 11 stressed
the importance of relatively cheaper transport. Eleven companies
mentioned good marketing but this explanation does not seem very
plausible in view of the earlier answer about how the firms obtain
information about export markets.-70 -
(e) How Useful is Government Assistance to Exporting?
The general answer here was that in fact the government does
not provide any assistance to exporting. One company mentioned
in a theoretical way income tax concession to "export expansion"
companies. We have dealt with this matter at the beginning and
it appears doubtful whether this concession has assisted exports.
The government does not provide export risks insurance, or export
credit. The Development Bank (partly-owned by government) does
contribute to enquity capital of many firms but not to exporting
costs. And in any case several companies felt that the procedures
for any assistance under the Economic Expansion Act, or from the
Development Bank of Singapore were "troublesome". One company
mentioned that a certificate from the Government in trade with
Russia (barter, state-trading, e.g. Singapore shoes against
Russian machinery) helps. Three mentioned tariff exemption on
inputs, but two said the}' would like to get it.
A few companies complained that the Singapore Government does
not issue at all any Health Certificates for foodstuffs (of
the kind that the Singapore Government itself requires from
foreign exporters to Singapore). This precludes them from selling
in some markets. A few companies mentioned the assistance of the
government with provision of sites or premises. This was a x^rong
answer to the particular question. The help of the government in
this case was a help to the establishment of the firm not to
exporting as such. If the question were put about establishment
help in all probability a sizeable proportion of firms would
mention advice of the E.D.B., and the provision of land and premises
at reasonable price or rental. Against this, however, one or two- 71 -
firms mentioned that the government (Jurong Town Corporation)
expects the payment of rental for the whole year in advance.
This for a brand-new company, in advance of sales, is usually
difficult, and probably unnecessary. Reduction of the rental
payment period, or better still, postponement of the payment
date to the end of the year would have been much more helpful.
In addition, one or two companies mentioned that building
approvals take extremely long time so that often the firms
would suffer losses (increases of costs) unless they chance
it and go on with construction on the assumption that approval
would be forthcoming.
Briefly, the questionnaire-interview fully confirms the
theoretical analysis of the first part of this paper to the
effect that the government does not in fact assist exports
directly. Such assistance as there is, is indirect, as discussed
in the first part of the paper.
(f) To Which Group of Countries is the Export Effort Going to Be
Directed?
Perhaps one should not be surprised that this set of questions
has not produced any unexpected or any very clear-cut answer.
Twenty firms plan to develop markets in industrial countries
"other than West Europe", fourteen firms in West Europe, thirteen
in "developing countries" and four in the Communist countries.- 72 -.
(g) Pricing of Exports and Provision of Credit
Thirteen companies (out of 29) admitted that they charge lower
prices for exports, and one company said that it does "not wish
to reveal", which presumably means that they do charge lower price
for exports. Against this two companies said that they charge
lower prices in Singapore. This means that the remaining fourteen
companies charge the same price. One firm out of this last fourteen
apparently has the most rational policy. It gave the best answer:
"Price charged depends on the local elasticity of demand in the
buyer's market". As for those 13 or 14 companies that do charge lower
prices abroad, 5 companies specifically went to qualify the
statement by adding that the lower price was due to larger size
of foreign orders. It is probable that of there were time during the
interview to elucidate reasons (without suggesting the answer
to the respondent) that at least several other respondents would
have said that the lower price to foreigner was due to larger
order, quicker payment, greater security of payment, greater
frequency of orders etc., but it would have been impossible
to check the veracity.
As for the two firms that charge lower prices in Singapore, it is
possible (but not certain) that they sell locally "seconds" only.
It would thus appear that a proportion of firms, a minimum
9 out of 29, do charge lower prices to foreign customers for the
same size of order, though the other circumstances of the trans-
action might not be equal.
As for supply of credit by exporter only 6 companies out of 29
admitted that they give credit to foreign buyers, but it is short-
term, maximum 3 months. Some companies also give credit to
Singapore buyers.- 73 -
(h) Efforts that the Firm Can Take to Increase Exports
Adapting the quality and design 9
Improvement of service 8
Improvement and extension of foreign
sales network 17
Increasing production capacity. 12
Improvement of organisation of firm 8
Any other ("please state"):
More workers 1
Use of sub-contracting 1
Better machinery 1
Raising more capital 1
Training labour 1
It is difficult to be sure how much weight should be attached
to the frequency of particular answers in respect to what the
firms think should be done to increase exports. Strictly speaking
a good (and reasonably modest) manager should, give a positive
answer to every one of the listed factors. Only one manager
(who said; "We have a High Quality Award") might be excused for
thinking that for a while he need not worry about quality. None-
theless some factors were often not mentioned. The factor that
was most frequently mentioned was "improvement and extension
of foreign sales network", however, this is so obvious an answer
that one cannot be certain that the managers really meant to do
it (and did not just say what might be expected of them). The
other frequent response was "increasing production capacity".
This is not only an "obvious" answer but also plausible, given
the fact that many firms already work even the troublesomeand
expensive third shift (after 11 p.m.), which means that they are
using their capacity to the full.- 74 -
PART IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given the state of Singapore's balance of payments accounts since
1964 it is impossible to make any quantitative forecasts of what
Singapore's exports are likely to be in the future. This is not
because Singapore does not have many statistical sources on foreign
trade. In fact, there are two independent sources. One, essentially a
balance of payments estimate, is derived from export declarations of
firms. It would be good but for the fact that by an official Singapore
decision it excludes trade with Indonesia, and although it is impossible
to prove it with official figures it is almost certainly the case the
Indonesia is at present Singapore's best customer.
One could, of course, take Indonesia's trade figures on the matter
of Singapore-Indonesia trade, but the Indonesian figures fail to catch
the bulk of the trade between the two countries which is smuggling
goods under a barter system.
The exclusion in the balance of payments of Singapore of trade with
Indonesia has, of course, produced a major problem for the statistician
in making up the balance of external accounts. Given that exclusion the
external accounts of Singapore would just not balance, and in addition
Singapore would show a most serious, apparently fundamental disequi-
librium. The statistician has found as easy way of solving his problem.
He put the net balance of trade with Indonesia into the category "Errors
and omissions", usually a minor item in the balance of payments of
any country. In this case, however, this item is not minor, it amounts to—75--
half of Singapore's exports (or one third of imports), thus the
statistician felt compelled to rename it into the "Balancing
item".
The other two major omissions from exports figures could be
remedied. One is the growing export of a range of goods taken out of
the country by tourists.The foreign exchange receipts from this source
appear in the balance of payments partly as "services" rendered to
foreigners, and partly as capital inflow. The third major omission
from the figure of exports in putting the value of ship-repair for
foreign owners into the category of "Services". For this one, accurate
figures are available and the exclusion is purely nominal.
The other set of figures on exports (but on exports only) comes
direct from the source, and an excellent one, namely the Annual
Census of Manufacturing. Since the census questionnaire does not ask
for the by-the-country figures, this source does not have any
deliberate suppression of trade with Indonesia. But it is a well-
known fact that the "unofficial" trade with Indonesia is carried out
by merchants not by manufacturers. In addition, again manufacturers
making their returns do not know how much of the goods is taken out
by the tourists.
One should add that even if the suppressed figures were revealed
making firm forecasts of future Singapore exports would, at the
present stage of economic development of Singapore, be extremely
hazardous. There is a discontinuity in Singapore's growth in the last
5-7 years after Singapore became independent, received several
shocks, and responded magnificently to the challenge of the situation.
Everything started to change rapidly in those last few years, the labour
relation, the population growth, investment rate, capital inflow etc.
The only prediction that one can safely make is that Singapore's
exports are to grow very rapidly in the near future up to say 20 years,
unless there is a major political upheaval in the area, particularly- 76 -
in Indonesia. (One could say that Singapore has a vested interest
in Indonesia's prosperity). After some 20 years Singapore's exports
will level off because by that time the size of the labour force of
Singapore will stabilize, due to the present zero-population growth
policy of the government. The only other danger to Singapore's
exports could come from internal political unrest in Singapore
itself, but this is for some years, at least, quite unlikely
because the present P.A.P. government is extremely strongly seated
inthe saddle, indeed viewed from the point of view of the longer-run,
too strongly seatediAPPENDIX
TABLE Al
GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN, 1966-1971
(AT CURRENT PRICES)
Economic Sector
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""Domestic trade" means that both internal trade and the service
in, exporting "domestically-made" goods.
Source; Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance, March 1972.
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